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I. INTRODUCTION
1

Since the inception of the global financial crisis in 2008, financial regulators
throughout the world have focused on ways to repair the economic damage and
2
improve regulatory frameworks to prevent and detect future crises.
Fundamentally, the crisis was the result of an increasingly global financial
3
system that became plagued by growing macroeconomic imbalances. These
imbalances synthesized an unsustainable credit boom and a pattern of overpriced
assets, which eventually impaired banks’ ability and willingness to extend credit,
4
and ignited a free-fall in asset valuations. Beyond pure economics, institutional
weaknesses in corporate governance and failed regulatory schemes have also
5
been cited as significant contributors to the global financial crisis.
To address the immediate effects of the crisis, regulators inoculated their
6
respective economies with varied monetary responses. The most notable and
controversial of these rapid-fire reactions were the bailouts of financial
7
institutions, particularly those that occurred in the United States. Similar bailouts
and responsive measures occurred in Europe and have resulted in passionate
debates about whether further injections should be used to cure the ongoing
8
Eurozone debt crisis.
Looking through a long-term lens, regulators also took action to develop
ways to prevent future crises. In the United States, the Dodd-Frank Act was

1. The financial crisis was the culmination of economic and regulatory failures which developed over
time, but most commentators pinpointed 2008 as the point in which its detrimental effects were felt on a large
global scale. See Ioannis Glinavos, Regulation and the Role of Law in Economic Crisis, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV.
539, 551 (2010); see also Randal D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform,
2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 421 (2010); see also FIN. SERVICES AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_
review.pdf.
2. Nicolas Véron, Financial Reform After the Crisis: An Early Assessment (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ.,
Working Paper No. 12-2, 2012), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp12-2.pdf; Governor Daniel
K. Tarullo, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics:
Regulatory Reform Since the Financial Crisis (May 2, 2012).
3. FIN. SERVICES AUTH., supra note 1, at 28.
4. Id.
5. Kern Alexander, Reforming European Financial Supervision and the Role of EU Institutions, AMICUS
CURIAE, Summer 2010, available at http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/2787/1/Amicus82_KernAlexander.pdf.
6. Credit Crisis: Bailout Plan (TARP), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
subjects/c/credit_crisis/bailout_plan/index.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2010); Guynn, supra note 1, at 434-60.
7. Credit Crisis, supra note 6; Guynn, supra note 1, at 434-51.
8. As of the date this Comment is being written, the Eurozone debt crisis remains a political and
economic priority in Europe. See Michael P. Malloy, Zone Defence: The Euro Zone and the Crisis in Financial
Services Markets, in FINANCIAL CRISIS, GLOBALISATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 9 (David A. Frenkel &
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle eds., 2012); see also Europe Begins Working on Plan B for the Euro, SPIEGEL ONLINE
(Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,790543,00.html; see also Greece Likely to
Get Its Bailout, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/greece-likelyto-get-its-bailout/2012/02/17/gIQAxqjeMR_story.html.
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signed into law on July 21, 2010. Other prominent nations, including the United
Kingdom, took on equally aggressive roles in reconsidering their regulatory
10
systems. Indeed, the entire European Union has undergone significant financial
11
reform, which serves as the focus of this Comment.
While most commentators accept that the regulatory systems of leading
economic nations failed to prevent the crisis, the approaches to avoiding future
12
crises have been mixed. The variations in these reforms can be credited to
contrasting assumptions about the specific causes of the crisis and divergent
13
views of what objectives should be accomplished. Thus far, most of the postcrisis focus has been on ensuring the health of financial institutions and
protecting consumers, but regulators must be wary of any changes their new
regulatory frameworks will have on the competitiveness of the financial
14
markets. This is especially true as globalization increases and the world’s
economies continue to collide.
The regulatory overhaul in the European Union provides an illustrative case
study of post-crisis financial reform. The European Union’s experience is unique
because of its tiered structure, diverse national membership, and global economic
15
importance. Together, its twenty-seven Member States comprise the world’s
16
largest economy. Thus, the success of the European financial reforms is vital to
17
the goal of global economic recovery and will provide a prominent example of
financial regulatory practices for the future.
Since the inception of the crisis, the European Union has created two new
regulatory bodies: the European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”) and the
18
European System of Financial Supervisors (“ESFS”). The ESRB is responsible
for macro-prudential oversight of the European Union, while the ESFS is
19
responsible for micro-prudential oversight. European Union leaders were
convinced that one of the primary drivers of the crisis was fragmented regulation
9. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html.
10. The United Kingdom is a Member State to the European Union. Nonetheless, it continues to take
aggressive measures to revamp its own regulatory scheme at the national level. See Eric J. Pan, Structural
Reform of Financial Regulation, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 796, 831-38 (2011).
11. See infra Part III.
12. Pan, supra note 10, at 796, 798-99.
13. Id. at 796, 799.
14. Id. at 796, 800.
15. See generally Basic Information on the European Union, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/abouteu/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
16. See How the EU Works: The Economy, EUR. UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/
economy/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) (based on GDP); Thomas A. Russo & Aaron J. Katzel, The
2008 Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath: Addressing the Next Debt Challenge 41 (Grp. of Thirty Occasional
Paper No. 82l, 2011).
17. Russo & Katzel, supra note 16.
18. Eddy Wymeersch, Europe’s New Financial Regulatory Bodies, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 443, 448 (2011).
19. Id.
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20

within the European Union. Regulatory arbitrage, borne out of this fragmented
21
regulatory scheme, was identified as an evil that needed to be mitigated. As
such, lawmakers gave the new ESFS the power to promulgate a common
technical rulebook for harmonized financial regulation across the European
22
Union.
This Comment discusses the establishment of the ESFS, its rulemaking
bodies, and how EU leaders can develop a common technical rulebook for
23
financial regulation. The goal is to provide an analytical framework and
suggestions for approaching the challenge of legislating this rulebook.
To begin, Part II of this Comment discusses the financial rulemaking process
in place prior to the recent reforms as well as the events triggering the European
regulatory response. Part III outlines the European Union’s response to the global
financial crisis, reviewing the seminal Jacques de Larosière Report, the
subsequent establishment of the ESFS, and the rationale for creating the common
technical rulebook. Part IV explores the legal basis and economic context of the
rulebook. Lastly, Part V focuses on how the financial rules should be enacted,
arguing that an increased use of Regulations and alternative levels of
harmonization are key to achieving uniform regulation that will mitigate
regulatory arbitrage within the European Union.
II. REGULATORY INADEQUACIES AND A CALL FOR ACTION
A. The Lamfalussy Process and Level 3 Committees
To better understand the changes made by the European Union, a preliminary
review of the financial rulemaking process that existed prior to the recent reforms
is necessary. The existing procedures—or perhaps more precisely, the existing
bodies responsible for regulatory uniformity—were eventually deemed
24
inadequate upon post-crisis evaluation by EU leaders and advisors.
25
The Lamfalussy Process, implemented in 2001, was erected in hopes of
26
strengthening EU financial regulation and making the legislative process more
20. See THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU 27
(2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf.
21. Id. at 27.
22. Communication from the Commission: European Financial Supervision, at 9, COM (2009) 252 final
(May 27, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/
communication_may2009/C-2009_715_en.pdf.
23. The ESRB will not be discussed in this Comment, except to the extent it is needed to illustrate the
broader structural landscape of the EU reforms.
24. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 41-42.
25. The process was the outcome of a report issued by the Committee of Wise Men, whose original task
was to recommend changes to securities legislation. The process has since been extended to other financial
sectors, including banking and insurance. See Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank
Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 389,
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flexible in light of rapid financial innovation. The process was meant to
facilitate the enactment, interpretation, and implementation of financial
28
legislation through four key levels. At Level 1, the European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union adopted the framework legislation of a given
29
financial rule. Level 2 involved the detailing of implementation measures for
30
that legislation, denominated by industry or sector. Level 3 provided for the
31
technical preparation of the rule’s implementation at the Member State level.
32
Finally, Level 4 consisted of the European Commission’s enforcement, and
33
Member State transposition, of the legislated law.
In hopes of creating stronger EU-level rules, the primary target of the recent
34
financial reforms was Level 3 of the Lamfalussy Process. Structurally, Level 3
preparation of Member State implementation was conducted by three EU-level
committees: the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (“CEBS”), the
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
35
(“CEIOPS”), and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”).
This group of bodies—commonly referred to as the “Level 3 Committees” or “L3
36
Committees”—was comprised of representatives of national supervisory bodies.
The goal of the Level 3 Committees was to ensure uniform application of the
37
legislated rules at the national level (i.e., among the Member States).

397 (2006).
26. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_
market/single_market_services/financial_services_general_framework/l32056_en.htm (last updated June 6,
2008).
27. Commission Staff Working Document for the Application of the Lamfalussy Process to EU Securities
Markets Legislation, at 3, SEC (2004) 1459 (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/sec-2004-1459_en.pdf.
28. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 26.
29. Id.; Alford, supra note 25, at 399. Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which
details the EU legislative process, the consent of both the Council and Parliament is required for legislative acts
to be passed in the European Union. The Council is comprised of Member State representatives. Peter O.
Mülbert & Alexander Wilhelm, Reforms of EU Banking and Securities Regulation After the Financial Crisis,
26 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 187, 189 (2011).
30. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 26; Alford, supra note 25, at 399-402.
31. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 26; Alford, supra note 25, at 399-402.
32. The European Commission is responsible for promoting EU harmonization by initiating new
legislation, enforcing EU treaty obligations of Member States and individuals, and exercising certain executive
powers. Mülbert & Wilhelm, supra note 29, at 190.
33. Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 26; Alford, supra note 25, at 399-403.
34. As part of the treaty-based framework of the European Union, the Lamfalussy Process is subject to
any changes in institutional and regulatory reforms that might occur within that framework. PIERRE SCHAMMO,
EU PROSPECTUS LAW 7-8 (2011).
35. Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process: Strengthening Supervisory Convergence, at 2, COM
(2007) 727 final (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/
committees/071120_final_report_en.pdf.
36. Id.; Alford, supra note 25, at 402.
37. Alford, supra note 25, at 402.
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The Lamfalussy Process was aimed at minimizing regulatory arbitrage by
providing a transparent approach that was open to input from market
38
professionals, consumer bodies, and Member State regulators. Nonetheless, the
process proved susceptible to inconsistencies at the Member State level because
national regulators had the ability to add national rules to those agreed upon by
39
40
the Level 3 Committees. This practice, referred to as “gold-plating,” weakened
the goals of the Lamfalussy Process and provided confusion for the role of the
41
Level 3 Committees. Also, because the membership of the Level 3 Committees
was comprised of national supervisors, there were instances in which a
supervisor’s duty to his nation conflicted with his duty as a member of the Level
42
3 Committee.
As one might expect, these supervisors usually favored the
43
interests of their respective Member States over those of the Union.
Although hailed by some as having done an impressive job in light of each
44
committee’s limited personnel and budget, the Level 3 Committees were
generally evaluated as having an inconsistent influence on Member State
supervisors in performing their day-to-day supervisory duties at the national
45
level. The crux of the criticism aimed at the committees was that they had a
46
poorly-defined role in the legislative process.
The lack of legal power vested in the Level 3 Committees was cited as the
47
root cause of these deficiencies. Although the decisions adopted by the Level 3
Committees were designed to “clearly carry considerable authority,” they were
48
not legally binding decisions. Member States could essentially override the
decisions of the committees, undermining the effectiveness of the Lamfalussy
49
Process and providing a source of regulatory fragmentation. With the
development of the global financial crisis, the stage was set to reform the
legislative process and provide EU-level lawmakers increased power to mandate
uniform financial rules and mitigate detrimental practices like gold-plating.

38. Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 35, at 5; Alford, supra note 25, at 402.
39. Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 35, at 5.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 5, 9.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id.
44. KAREL LANNOO, CEPS POLICY BRIEF, NO. 241, THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: A
MID-TERM REVIEW 2 (2011), available at http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/5500/pdf.
45. Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 35, at 5.
46. See Commission Staff Working Document for the Application of the Lamfalussy Process to EU
Securities Markets Legislation, supra note 27, at 10.
47. See Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 35, at 9.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 5, 9.
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B. A Call for Action in the European Union
The effects of the subprime mortgage crisis that began in the United States
spread quickly around the world—the European Union and its Member States
50
were not spared. Mirroring the events in the United States, a credit crunch soon
51
developed in Europe. Relaxed borrowing standards in European countries were
fueling higher property valuations, while national regulators ignored concerns
52
about the dangerous increases in debt. When prices of the underlying assets
began to fall, European banks were confronted with liquidity problems, which for
53
some, grew into larger solvency problems. A domino effect resulted where
credit became leaner and increased austerity measures were implemented, both of
54
which furthered the economic slowdown.
By late October 2008, a call for action from the public and European
Parliament was heard by European Commission President José Manuel Barroso,
who appointed a panel of experts headed by Jacques de Larosière to articulate a
55
plan that would address the shortcomings of EU financial regulation. In
November 2010, the European Union answered the call by adopting a new
56
regulatory structure based on the de Larosière Group’s findings.
III. CALL ANSWERED: THE DE LAROSIÈRE REPORT AND FINANCIAL REFORM
A. The de Larosière Report
In response to the financial crisis and subsequent calls for action, European
Commission President Josè Manuel Barroso recognized the need for an
50. The more technical nuances of the economic factors leading up to the crisis are outside the scope of
this Comment. For a thorough discussion of the developments leading up to the crisis, with specific implications
for the European Union, see Anu Arora, The 2007-09 Banking Crisis and the EU’s Regulatory Response, 21
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 603 (2010).
51. Russo & Katzel, supra note 16.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 42.
54. Id.
55. EU Panel on Banking Supervision Raises Concerns, EURACTIV.COM (Oct. 23, 2008),
http://www.euractiv.com/financial-services/eu-panel-banking-supervision-raises-concerns/article-176600.
56. Parliament Gives Green Light to New Financial Supervision Structure, EUR. PARLIAMENT NEWS
(Sept.
23,
2010),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/headlines/content/20100910FCS81938/012/html/
Parliament-gives-green-light-to-new-financial-supervision-architecture; Press Release, Council of the Eur.
Union, Financial Supervision: Council Adopts Legal Texts Establishing the European Systemic Risk Board and
Three New Supervisory Authorities (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/117747.pdf; Council Regulation 1093/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) (EU),
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0012:0047:EN:PDF
(establishing the EBA); Council Regulation 1094/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) (EU), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0048:0083:EN:PDF (establishing the EIOCPA);
Council Regulation 1095/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 331) (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0084:0119:EN:PDF (establishing the ESMA).
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57

independent review of financial regulation within the European Union. In late
October 2008, Barroso asked Jacques de Larosière to head a High Level Group
(“Group”) of financial experts to report findings and recommendations on ways
58
to improve financial supervision in Europe. In the resulting de Larosière Report
(“Report”), released on February 25, 2009, the Group made thirty-one specific
59
recommendations to the European Commission. Among the advice given, the
Group urged Member States and the European Parliament to avoid regulatory
60
inconsistencies and harmonize a set of core financial rules. Additionally, the
Group envisioned a European System of Financial Supervisors that would be
61
responsible for implementing this set of financial rules.
Although it recognized that the majority of the regulatory issues encountered
were candidates for broader international responses, the de Larosière Group
identified the “lack of a consistent set of rules” as an issue of particular
62
importance to the European Union. According to the Report, the structure of the
European Union, comprised of a single financial market supervised by various
63
levels of rulemakers, exposed European financial regulation to inconsistencies.
The Group advised that while EU-level rules should certainly provide a set of
“minimum core standards” for harmonization, Member States should be allowed
to adopt stricter standards when deemed domestically appropriate by each
64
Member States’ national supervisors. Although a minimum set of standards was

57. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, High Level Expert Group on EU Financial Supervision to
Hold First Meeting on 12 November (Nov. 11, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1679.
58. Id.; THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 3; Duncan Alford, Supervisory Colleges: The
Global Financial Crisis and Improving International Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 57,
80 (2010).
59. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20.
60. Id. at 29. The Group observed a need to “tackle the current absence of a truly harmonised set of core
rules in the EU,” and it recommend that:
Member States and the European Parliament should avoid in the future legislation that permits
inconsistent transposition and application; [and] the Commission and the [L]evel 3 Committees
should identify those national exceptions, the removal of which would improve the functioning
of the single financial market; reduce distortions of competition and regulatory arbitrage; or
improve the efficiency of cross-border financial activity in the EU. Notwithstanding, a Member
State should be able to adopt more stringent national regulatory measures considered to be
domestically appropriate for safeguarding financial stability as long as the principles of the
internal market and agreed minimum core standards are respected.
Id. (Recommendation 10). The de Larosiere report was by no means the first time the concept of regulatory
harmonization was recommended. The concept has been discussed for some time, and the Lamfalussy Process
was a first attempt at harmonization. See Thomas M.J. Moolers, Sources of Law in European Securities
Regulation—Effective Regulation, Soft Law and Legal Taxonomy from Lamfalussy to de Larosiere, 11 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 379, 381 (2010).
61. Id. at 48, 51, 53, 56.
62. Id. at 27.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 28, 29.
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encouraged, complete consistency among all Member States was not identified as
65
an ultimate end.
The de Larosière Group also recommended that EU officials create the
European System of Financial Supervisors to control micro-prudential
66
67
supervision of the Single Market and promulgate the common rulebook. As
proposed, the ESFS would be a network of three new EU-level authorities
combined with the college of supervisors (an existing system of Member State
68
supervisors that maintained a consultative role in the Lamfalussy Process).
Because of the perceived ineffectiveness of the Level 3 Committees, the Group
recommended that the three new authorities be vested with authority broader than
69
the Level 3 Committees as they then existed. In the Report, the three authorities
70
were visualized as “enhanced [L]evel 3 [C]ommittees.”
B. Creation of the European System of Financial Supervisors
The European Commission welcomed the de Larosière Report, taking
ambitious steps towards implementing many of the de Larosière Group’s
71
recommendations, including the establishment of the ESFS. Decisively, the
Commission drafted a package of legislative proposals based on the Report by
72
September 2009. A year later, in November 2010, the European Parliament and
65. Id.
66. Micro-prudential supervision consists primarily of supervision of financial institutions. Alford, supra
note 58, at 68. Examples of micro-prudential regulation include “certification of those working in the financial
sector; rules on what assets can be held by whom; how instruments are listed, traded, sold and reported; and
measures of the value and riskiness of assets.” THE WARWICK COMM’N, THE WARWICK COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REFORM: IN PRAISE OF UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELDS 12 (2009), available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/financialreform/report/; see also Pablo Iglesias
Rodriguez, Towards a New European Financial Architecture, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2009). See
infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of the Single Market.
67. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 48. In Recommendation 18 of the Report, the Group
recommended that the ESFS be set up as a decentralized network, comprised of three groups with distinct roles:
existing national supervisors would continue to carry-out day-to-day supervision;
three new European Authorities would be set up, replacing CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR,
with the role coordinate the application of supervisory standards and guarantee strong
cooperation between the national supervisors;
colleges of supervisors would be set up for all major cross-border institutions.
Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 41, 42.
70. Id. at 47.
71. Communication for the Spring European Council: Driving European Recovery, at 6, 7, COM (2009)
114 final (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2009:0114:FIN:EN:PDF.
72. Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a European
Banking Authority, COM (2009) 501 final (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009_501_en.pdf (proposing establishment of the
EBA); Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European
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Council approved the financial supervision package, with the ESFS to begin its
73
work on January 1, 2011.
In its final form, the ESFS was established as a network of three bodies: (1) a
set of three financial supervisors at the EU level, known as the European
Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”); (2) a Joint Committee to steer the efforts of
the ESAs; and (3) a network of national supervisors responsible for day-to-day
74
supervision at the Member State level, subject to oversight by the ESAs. Broken
down further, the ESAs consist of a European Banking Authority (“EBA”), based
in London, England; a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
(“EIOPA”), based in Frankfurt, Germany; and a European Securities and Markets
75
Authority (“ESMA”), based in Paris, France.
In contrast to the Level 3 Committees, the Commission envisioned the ESAs
as authorities with legal personalities having additional power and
76
responsibilities. Specifically, the new ESAs have responsibility for both
regulatory and supervisory functions—the regulatory function primarily refers to
77
rulemaking, while the supervisory function refers to application of the rules.
Under their regulatory power, the ESAs are responsible for developing binding
technical standards and providing interpretative guidelines to assist Member
78
State authorities in applying such rules. This means that the ESAs, as part of the
ESFS, have the legal authority to promulgate a common technical rulebook for
79
financial regulation throughout the European Union.

Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, COM (2009) 502 final (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009_502_en.pdf
(proposing establishment of the EIOPA); Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing a European Securities and Markets Authority, COM (2009) 503 final (Sept. 23, 2009),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/committees/supervision/20090923/com2009_
503_en.pdf (proposing establishment of the ESMA).
73. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union supra note 56; Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union,
supra note 57; Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 56;
Council Regulation1095/2010, supra note 56.
74. Communication from the Commission, supra note 22, at 8.
75. Id.; Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 56;
Council Regulation1095/2010, supra note 56.
76. Alford, supra note 58, at 68.
77. A third, institutional function has been identified. This refers to the coordinated efforts of the ESRB
and ESFS in preventing and managing financial risk in the European Union. While relevant to the success of the
EU financial reforms, this function is beyond the scope of this Comment. LANNOO, supra note 44; Wymeersch,
supra note 18, at 2; Nicolette Kost de Sevres & Lorenzo Sasso, The New European Financial Markets Legal
Framework: A Real Improvement?, 7 CAP. MARKETS L. J., 30, 37 (2011).
78. Communication from the Commission, supra note 22.
79. LANNOO, supra note 44, at 2; see also infra Part IV.
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C. An Introduction to the Common Technical Rulebook
In recommending the common technical rulebook, the de Larosière Group
80
identified four reasons for having a harmonized set of financial rules. First, the
Group noted that the Single Market of the European Union, by nature, requires a
81
consistent set of rules in order to function properly. Second, it was concerned
that competition within the European Union would suffer if there were
inconsistent financial regulations among the Member States—the Group was
worried about the opportunity for institutions to practice regulatory arbitrage
82
through gold-plating. Third, the Group observed that a fragmented regulatory
environment presented magnified efficiency, risk management, and capital
83
allocation problems for cross-border institutions. Fourth, crisis management,
especially for cross-border institutions, was deemed more difficult in a regulatory
84
environment lacking consistent standards.
By recommending the
implementation of a common technical rulebook, the Group was optimistic that
85
these issues could be resolved.
The European Commission agreed, finding the Group’s suggestion to
86
develop a set of harmonized rules “of particular interest.” Beyond the four
rationales identified by the de Larosière Group, the Commission noted additional
benefits to a common technical rulebook at the EU level, including strengthened
87
stability, equal treatment, and lower compliance costs. The Commission
premised the ability of the ESAs to establish a common rulebook on “principles
88
of partnership, flexibility and subsidiarity.”
IV. THE COMMON TECHNICAL RULEBOOK: ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The development of the common technical rulebook is limited by the
economic and legal setting of the European Union. Economically, regulators
must be wary of the impacts their legislation will have on both the international

80. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 27.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Communication for the Spring European Council, supra note 71, at 5.
87. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, Financial Services: Additional Legislative Proposal to
Complete the Framework for Fin. Supervision in Eur. 2 (Jan. 19, 2011), available at europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-11-49_en.pdf. Uniform laws help reduce transaction costs, especially in a diverse situation such has
the European Union. For a sound discussion on the economic role of uniform laws, see John Linarelli, The
Economics of Uniform Laws and Uniform Lawmaking, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1387 (2003).
88. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, Financial Services: Commission Proposes Stronger
Financial Supervision in Europe (May 27, 2009), available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-836_en.pdf.
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markets and the European Union’s Single Market. Legally, lawmakers must act
within their affirmatively granted power and abide by the broader treaty-based
90
principles that permeate throughout the EU legal system. This Part discusses
how these factors combine to provide the legal basis for enactment of the
financial rules in the common technical rulebook.
A. International and Single Market Implications
While most of the attention in developing the common rulebook will focus
on the European Union and its Member States, regulators must also be aware of
any international implications. Every piece of legislation enacted by the ESAs
will have effects felt beyond the borders of the European Union, either directly or
91
indirectly. This is a natural consequence of the increasingly global economy.
Likewise, the links between the international community and the European
92
Union will have reciprocal implications within the European Union itself. The
European Union, as a representative of its twenty-seven Member States, is
heavily involved in a number of international economic forums—most notably,
93
the Basel Accords, G-20 Summits, and the International Monetary Fund. In this
context, the de Larosière Group stressed that the European Union should “speak
94
with one voice.” Because of the impacts that each of these external
commitments will have on the European Union’s relationship with its Member
States, EU leaders must be careful not to blur its goals as a Single Market regime
with those it has as a global economic participant.
Within the European Union, any rules adopted under the common rulebook
95
must be consistent with the policies of the European Union’s Single Market.

89. See infra Part IV.A.
90. See infra Part IV.B.
91. See Herman Van Rompuy, Foreword to THE LESSONS OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS THAT SHOULD
SHAPE THE EU’S G20 STANCE, FRIENDS OF EUROPE (2011), available at www.friendsofeurope.org/
Portals/13/Events/Roundtables/2011/Taming_the_turmoil/Lessons_of_Eurozone_Crisis_that_Should_Shape_th
e_EU%27s_G20_Stance.pdf (noting that “[t]he destinies of the world’s main economies are more intertwined
than ever before.”).
92. This applies with equal force to the European Union as a whole as well as Member States in their
individual capacity as players in the world economy. See Rodriguez, supra note 66 at 5-6.
93. See Organisation and Governance, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/about/
orggov.htm (last updated December 19, 2011) (noting that members are central banks or monetary authorities,
including the European Central Bank); see Relations with the IMF, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/international/forums/imf/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) (clarifying that while
“only [individual countries] are members of the IMF, the European Union is represented therein by its Member
States.”); see About G20 Member Countries, G20.ORG, http://www.g20.org/infographics/20121201/
780989503.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2012) (indicating the European Union as a member).
94. THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 29.
95. This principle is legally mandated by Article 114 of the TFEU. Communication from the Commission,
supra note 22, at 14.
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The Single Market, also referred to as the Internal Market, represents the efforts
of the European Union and its twenty-seven Member States to promote the “four
97
freedoms”: the free circulation of people, goods, services, and capital. As
described under the EU treaties, the policies served by the Single Market include
promoting sustainable economic growth and competition, ensuring social
98
progress, and fostering cohesion among the Member States. Accordingly, the
Regulations that created the ESFS provide that any actions taken by the ESAs,
including the promulgation of the common rulebook, must be done in the context
99
of the Single Market as a whole.
B. Legal Authority to Create the Common Technical Rulebook
The European Union’s source of power for creating the ESFS and the ESAs
was derived from Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
100
Union (“TFEU”). Under Article 114, EU lawmakers can adopt measures that
allow for the creation of a “[c]ommunity body responsible for contributing to the
implementation of a process of harmonisation,” so long as that body’s
101
responsibilities are closely linked to the functioning of the Single Market.
Because one of the responsibilities of the ESAs will be to develop a common
rulebook for uniform application of financial rules within the Single Market of

96. A distinction may be framed by narrowly defining the Single Market as having purely economic
implications, while characterizing the Internal Market as one with both economic and social implications.
Paulina Dejmek, The EU Internal Market for Financial Services: A Look at the First Regulatory Responses to
the Financial Crisis and a View to the Future, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 455, 456 (2009). For the purposes of this
Comment, this distinction will be ignored, although the social implications of any financial rule will surely be
considered by EU lawmakers when creating the common rulebook.
97. General Policy Framework, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index
_1_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2011).
98. Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union art. 3, Mar. 30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 83) 15,
available at eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF.
99. Paragraph 11 of each Regulation Preamble provides:
The Authority should act with a view to improving the functioning of the internal market, in
particular by ensuring a high, effective and consistent level of regulation and supervision
taking account of the varying interests of all Member States and the different nature of
financial institutions. The Authority should protect public values such as the stability of the
financial system, the transparency of markets and financial products, and the protection of
depositors and investors. The Authority should also prevent regulatory arbitrage and guarantee
a level playing field, and strengthen international supervisory coordination, for the benefit of
the economy at large, including financial institutions and other stakeholders, consumers and
employees.
Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note 56; Council
Regulation1095/2010, supra note 56; THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 41, 42.
100. Article 114 of the TFEU superseded Article 95 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(“EC Treaty”). Kost de Sevres & Sasso, supra note 77. For a timeline of the relevant EU treaties, see Mülbert &
Wilhelm, supra note 29; EU Treaties, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decisionmaking/treaties/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
101. Communication from the Commission, supra note 22, at 14.
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the European Union, this required nexus was satisfied when the ESFS was
102
established.
Under the Regulations establishing the ESAs, the power of the ESAs to issue
binding law is limited to defining technical standards related to the functioning of
103
the Single Market. The Regulations further note that the adopted rules “shall
not imply strategic decisions or policy choices and their content shall be
104
delimited by the legislative acts on which they are based.” In other words, the
laws provided under the common rulebook will be construed strictly as technical
rules rather than policy-laden standards applicable in a broader context.
In addition to legislating binding technical law, the ESAs may also issue
“guidelines and recommendations addressed to competent authorities or financial
105
institutions” to assist with implementation of the technical rules enacted. These
guidelines and recommendations will have no force of law, but will promote
coherent implementation of the common rules at the Member State level,
106
contributing to the goal of harmonization.
The technical standards adopted by the ESAs may be drafted by any one of
107
the three authorities and submitted to the Commission for endorsement. Upon
review of the draft, the European Commission will take action in one of three
ways: (1) forward the legislation to the European Parliament and the Council for
review and ultimate adoption; (2) ask the drafting ESA to amend the draft and
resubmit an updated version to the Commission; or (3) choose not to endorse the
108
draft in its entirety. In cases where the drafted legislation is severable, the
109
Commission may endorse, amend, or reject the ESA’s draft in part.
C. Legislative Toolbox: Directives and Regulations
EU lawmakers have a flexible regulatory system in which to effectuate
harmonized laws within the European Union. In resolving the question of how to
102. Id.
103. See Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10; see also Council Regulation
1094/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10; see also Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10; LANNOO,
supra note 44. This principle is consistent with the treaty-based limitations placed on all EU financial
legislation. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 114, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.
104. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note
56, at art. 10; Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 10.
105. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 16; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note
56, at art. 16; Council Regulation1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 16.
106. LANNOO, supra note 44.
107. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note
56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15.
108. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note
56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15.
109. Council Regulation 1093/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1094/2010, supra note
56, at art. 15; Council Regulation 1095/2010, supra note 56, at art. 15.
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enact the common technical rulebook, EU lawmakers have two primary tools for
110
enacting binding law: Directives and Regulations.
111
Directives, founded in a principles-based approach, constitute EU law that
require certain end goals, but allow Member States to choose how to adapt their
112
laws to meet those goals. The process of implementation at the national level is
113
known as “transposition.” According to the European Commission, “Directives
are used to bring different national laws into line with each other, and are
particularly common in matters affecting the operation of the [S]ingle
114
[M]arket.” Thus, Directives have historically been considered a valuable tool in
115
approaching financial legislation.
As a separate instrument for EU lawmakers, Regulations constitute
immediately binding law with legal force equivalent to each Member States’ own
116
laws. Regulations are examples of rules-based regulations, which tend to
provide predictability, but less discretion than principles-based regulations such
117
as Directives. Unlike Directives, Regulations become effective without further
118
action by the Member States. In other words, Regulations are immediately and
directly applicable throughout the European Union—there is no transposition
119
process.
In contemplating legislation for the common technical rulebook, EU
lawmakers must decide whether to enact financial rules as Directives or
Regulations. A rule-by-rule approach is the necessary course, but, as will be
discussed in the following Part, lawmakers should consider an increased use of
Regulations to effectuate their goal of EU-wide harmonization.

110. What Is EU Law?, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/treaty_en.htm (last
updated June 25, 2011).
111. Principles-based regulation is based on the communication of certain goals and expectations between
regulatory parties, as opposed to relationships in which one party directs or controls the other. Glinavos, supra
note 1.
112. What Are EU Directives?, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_
directive_en.htm (last updated June 25, 2011); Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities
Law After the Financial Services Action Plan?, 14 STAN. J.L BUS. & FIN. 43, 48 (2008).
113. What Are EU Directives?, supra note 112.
114. Id.
115. See Rosa M. Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe,
10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 61 (2003).
116. What Are EU Directives?, supra note 112.
117. Glinavos, supra note 1.
118. What Are EU Directives?, supra note 112.
119. LANNOO, supra note 44.
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V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO ESTABLISHING THE COMMON
TECHNICAL RULEBOOK
In defining a set of harmonized technical rules to prevent and detect future
financial crises, EU lawmakers have a complex task that will require a
120
coordinated and flexible approach. As discussed below, much of this task
includes balancing competing interests and ideas. This Part examines these issues
and develops two primary recommendations on how the common technical
rulebook should be enacted. First, lawmakers should consider varied levels of
harmonization to provide a flexible approach to the rulebook. Second, a wider
use of Regulations, rather than Directives, should be considered in pursuit of
regulatory uniformity and harmonization. For completeness, threshold
considerations of legislative subject matter and regulatory responsibility are
discussed first.
A. Threshold Issues: What Should Be Regulated and Who Should Regulate
EU lawmakers face a dynamic challenge in deciding what and whether to
regulate certain financial subject matter. Due to the rapid proliferation of
complex financial instruments and transactions throughout the world, there is an
increasingly large pool of financial subject matter that has avoided regulation
121
altogether. At the same time, existing subject matter may have transformed or
122
become obsolete. Thus, the first issue in enacting any financial rule is deciding
whether the subject matter is ripe for legislation—or, where regulations already
exist, deciding whether those rules remain well-suited for that particular subject
123
matter.
Practically, the issue will often be resolved by the obvious premise that the
need for regulation presupposes an existing concern over potential or past
124
125
financial risk. In other words, the topics will present themselves. Because
legislation is often a response mechanism to an identified event or crisis,
126
lawmakers usually concern themselves with resolving issues already past. This
was the case with the recent financial reforms and will continue to be the case

120. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, supra note 88.
121. See Alexandra Hennessy, Redesigning Financial Supervision in the European Union 7 (Mar. 3,
2011) (paper prepared for presentation), available at http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/12d_hennessy.pdf
(discussing the difficulty in financial lawmaking due to “continuously evolving [financial markets] as a result of
innovation and international integration”).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See generally Pan, supra note 10, at 813.
125. See generally id.
126. Id.
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going forward. At the same time, lawmakers must be careful not to fall prey to
hasty judgment—it is easy to react impulsively to a crisis while either ignoring
future events or overcompensating for the crisis in a way detrimental to future
128
developments. As such, the standards adopted under the common technical
rulebook should address current issues, but also be agile enough to address future
129
risks and perpetually new financial subject matter.
The question of who should regulate focuses on the choice between
130
establishing a financial rule at the EU level or the Member State level. While
the ESAs may have the legal authority to legislate a certain financial rule at the
EU level, other practical or prudential considerations may deter them from doing
so. As would be expected, these considerations are susceptible to divergent
theories about degrees of regulatory centralization and the practice of legislative
federalism, providing a possible source of conflict between EU authorities and
131
individual Member States.
A logical maxim of financial regulation states that “the structure of [a]
regulatory system needs to reflect the structure of the markets that are
132
regulated.” This principle, which speaks to degrees of regulatory centralization,
becomes harder to apply when there is a multilayered system of regulatory
133
authorities, such as in the case the European Union.
Historically, there exist two contrasting views with respect to what degree of
134
regulatory centralization is needed in the European Union. The first view,
generally favored by the more affluent Member States such as the United
127. While there was certainly a European call for responsive reform, a broader channel for change was
submitted under the G-20 summits. In the European Union, the establishment of the ESRB and the ESFS have
been movements of reform beyond the framework developed at the G-20 summits. Alford, supra note 58, at 60.
128. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39 (2009)
(discussing the issue primarily in the context of U.S. financial reforms).
129. See Hennessy, supra note 121, at 28.
130. EU-level legislation preempts Member State law to the extent there is a conflict. The concept of
shared competence, derived from the principle of conferral, implies that Member States may take action so long
as EU-level regulators have not exercised their competence to legislate. This concept affects the extent to which
subject matter can be regulated at the EU level (or, in the negative, the extent to which Member States cannot
regulate certain subject matter). Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union, supra note 98, at art.
5; Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 2; Dejmek, supra note 96, at 457. Broadly speaking, this
concept is similar to the concept of concurrent jurisdiction between state courts and federal courts in the U.S.
judicial system.
131. See, e.g., Written Evidence From the British Bankers’ Association, U.K. PARLIAMENT: EUR.
SCRUTINY COMM. (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm 201012/cmselect/
cmeuleg/1817/1817vw04.htm (questioning whether there is a need for “more or less Europe” in U.K. bank
regulation).
132. Lastra, supra note 115, at 51 (citing Richard K. Abrams & Michael Taylor, Issues in the Unification
of Financial Sector Supervision, International Money Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department, (IMF
Working Paper No. WP/00/213, 2000).
133. See id.
134. Id. at 55.
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Kingdom, is premised on achieving harmonization through greater cooperation
135
between national authorities, competitive pressures, and self-regulation. This
view supports a decentralized structure and would put more legislative power in
136
Member State authorities. Sitting on the opposite end of the spectrum, the
second view promotes a centralized architecture, with more regulatory power
137
vested in the primary federal body rather than national authorities.
Before the de Larosière Report and the creation of the ESRB and ESFS, the
concept of a single regulatory authority at the EU level had been discussed for
138
some time. Critics of a single-supervisor system feared that regulatory
centralization would provide an excessive concentration of power and lack of
139
accountability, overriding the basic premises of federalism.
As recommended by the de Larosière Group and enacted by EU leaders, the
formulation of the ESRB and ESFS appears to effectuate a middle ground by
forming a hybrid approach. In particular, the structure of the ESFS allows for
centralized rulemaking at the EU level through the common rulebook, while
mitigating dangers of regulatory abuse by allowing the existing college of
140
supervisors to handle day-to-day supervision at the national level. Thus, the
ESAs have been dubbed “embryonic federal supervisory authorities,” whose
success will depend on both their internal management and their cooperation
141
with national supervisors.
With this coordinated approach in mind, the relevance of supervision to the
analysis of the common rulebook becomes apparent: the structure adopted by the
European Union provides a formula in which rules and supervision appear to
142
have an inverse relationship. Where the details of EU-level rules are less
143
comprehensive, the ESAs may demand stricter supervision at the national level.
Conversely, where EU-level rules are technically robust, less Member State
144
supervision is warranted.
This regulation-supervision dichotomy sheds light on how EU lawmakers
can juggle the difficult balancing act they face in creating the common technical
rulebook. The ESAs are to abstain from engaging in the “Europeanisation” of all
145
financial supervision in the European Union, while trying to ensure the stability
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See generally id.
139. Id. at 52.
140. See supra Part III.
141. LANNOO, supra note 44, at 2.
142. See generally Hennessy, supra note 121.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Press Release, Council of the Eur. Union, Financial Supervision—Frequently Asked Questions 4
(May 27, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/251
&type=HTML.
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the Single Market through uniform financial regulation. If the ESAs yield to
Member States by providing for less obtrusive financial rules at the EU level,
they should require a higher level of EU-level supervision, and vice versa. In this
light, the success of the common rulebook will depend on how lawmakers go
about enacting EU-wide financial rules.
B. How the Rules Should Be Enacted: Toward a Broader Use of Regulations
and Alternative Degrees of Harmonization
Although EU lawmakers must abide by the legal and economic backdrop of
the European Union, they now have increased power and flexibility to regulate
147
the Single Market in a uniform manner. This Section explores how EU leaders
can fine-tune financial rules through an increased use of Regulations and varying
degrees of harmonization. The goal is to account for the regulatory flexibility
demanded by the unique nature of the European Union, while at the same time
achieving the level of harmonization envisioned by the de Larosière Group and
148
the European Commission in recommending the common technical rulebook.
Prior to the recent financial crisis, Directives were the preferred method for
149
achieving financial integration within the European Union. In the eyes of
lawmakers, the flexibility of Directives facilitated a framework that respected
150
and integrated Member States’ legal and cultural traditions. Additionally,
Directives were consistent with the desired principles of minimum harmonization
151
and mutual recognition. On the other hand, Regulations were used sparingly
because they were tailored toward the principle of full or detailed harmonization,
152
leaving little room for adaptive integration by national supervisors.
Undoubtedly, the use of Directives is less encroaching on Member States as
153
individual sovereigns. But in using Directives to provide minimum standards,
154
there is an increased exposure to the formation of divergent national regimes,
making it difficult for EU-level regulators to assess and enforce the
155
implementation of harmonized laws. As expressed by the de Larosière Report,

146. Id. at 5.
147. See supra Part IV.
148. See supra Part III.
149. Lastra, supra note 115, at 61.
150. Dejmek, supra note 96, at 459.
151. See Lastra, supra note 115, at 61.
152. See generally id. Of course, Member State voices were heard during the initial legislative process,
with national authorities playing important consultative roles. FIN. SERVICES AUTH., supra note 1, at 100. This
representation remains alive and well, as the college of supervisors is one of the foundational pillars of the
ESFS. See supra Part III.A.
153. See Dejmek, supra note 96, at 459.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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one of the primary goals of the financial reforms was to mitigate this type of
156
exposure and ease the implementation of uniform law.
Strangely, the de Larosière Group pointed out that in promulgating the
common rulebook, the ESAs should provide a minimum set of harmonized rules,
157
allowing Member States to add stricter rules at the national level. A narrow
reading of this recommendation would seem to add little to what was already
158
being achieved through the use of Directives. Permitting Member States to
adopt stricter rules within their respective sovereigns would perpetuate the
existence of regulatory arbitrage, an evil which both the de Larosière Group and
the European Commission identified as a source of financial risk within the
159
European Union.
Instead of maintaining strict adherence to the concept of minimum
harmonization, EU lawmakers should also consider the concepts of maximum
harmonization or a range of harmonization. These alternative degrees of
harmonization will allow for flexibility depending on what is being regulated
while ensuring the ultimate goal of uniform regulation.
Maximum harmonization requires that Member States adopt the rule at face
160
value, without the option to impose stricter rules. Such harmonization should
be used where the interest in maintaining strict uniformity outweighs Member
States’ interests in having regulatory choices and the ability to fine-tune EU-wide
161
rules. In other words, where a regulatory approach is unanimously agreed-upon
at the EU and Member State levels, maximum harmonization should be
162
implemented. Of course, rules enacted with maximum harmonization must be
tailored with the utmost detail to prevent any deviation and gold-plating.
As an additional alternative, using a range of harmonization provides
flexibility through the use of one of two methods: mandated flexibility based on
163
164
state-by-state fluctuations, or options between multiple but mandatory rules.
While use of ranges provides the most flexibility, it is susceptible to the same
evils as minimum harmonization—namely, regulatory arbitrage due to
inconsistencies or loopholes. The diverse nature of the constituent Member States
that make up the European Union will likely force the frequent use of

156. See THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 29.
157. See id.
158. See Lastra, supra note 115, at 61.
159. See supra Part III.
160. Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law After the Financial Services
Actoin Plan?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 43, 49 (2008).
161. Id.
162. See generally Alexandra Hennessy, Presentation at EUSA Conference: Redesigning Financial
Supervision in the European Union, (Mar. 3, 2011), available at http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/12d_hennessy
.pdf (characterizing and advocating against the concept as one of “hard law”).
163. Enriques & Gatti, supra note 160, at 49.
164. See id.
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harmonization ranges in pursuit of EU-wide regulatory uniformity. Nonetheless,
any such use should minimize the amount of discretion given to national
165
regulators by allowing fluctuations based on objective measures.
The choice between enacting rules as Regulations or Directives goes handin-hand with the choice among levels of harmonization. A principles-based
solution to mitigating regulatory arbitrage, which could be achieved through
Directives, would be to improve cooperation among the national regulators to
166
minimize the differences in laws. When considering the role of national
supervisors in the structure of the ESFS, the European Commission expressed its
167
hope that it had indeed provided this solution. It envisioned that national
supervisors would take an institution-wide view regarding supervision, rather
168
than views favorable to their respective nations. Although this is a laudable
169
solution, it is meaningless without a strict rule-based regulation to fall back on.
This is why the Lamfalussy Process failed; there was no hard-law mechanism for
170
EU-level regulators to ensure uniformity among the Member States.
Under the new hybrid approach of the ESFS, discussed above, the regulationsupervision dichotomy requires that if Member States are given more supervisory
latitude, then stricter technical rules should be in place as a check on this
171
power. To this end, EU lawmakers should not only go outside the box and
consider varying levels of harmonization, but they should also enact rules in the
form of Regulations to ensure the desired level of uniformity is precisely tuned.
Of course, the ESAs must be conscious of the balance between ensuring a
172
sound regulatory scheme while still fostering competition and growth. In
recommending an increased use of Regulations, the primary risk is that of
possible over-regulation, which may burden Member States and their constituents
by preventing cross-border institutions from doing business in a cost-effective
173
manner. Such over-regulation would also sacrifice the ideals of the Single
Market.

165. For example, the Capital Requirements Directives that are currently in force use a range of
harmonization by providing a menu of discretionary choices to Member States. See Council Directive 2006/48,
2006 O.J. (L 177) 1 (EC); Council Directive 2006/49, 2006 O.J. (L 177) 201 (EC). These Directives should be
reassessed to eliminate discretion subject to abuse.
166. See Pan, supra note 10, at 800.
167. See Alford, supra note 58, at 69.
168. See id. This favoritism marked one of the flaws of the newly-replaced Level 3 Committees.
Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process: Strengthening Supervisory Convergence, supra note 35, at 7.
169. But see Hennessy, supra note 162 (arguing for a sustained use of “soft law” cooperation at the
Member State level).
170. See Commission Review of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 35, at 9.
171. See supra Part V.A.
172. Pan, supra note 10, at 812.
173. On the other hand, under-regulation may perpetuate the existence of regulatory arbitrage and result
in a loss of confidence in the Single Market. See id.
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While these concerns implicate the dispute over what degree of centralization
is necessary, Member States worried about over-regulation may be appeased by
keeping in mind two legal limitations on the ESAs’ ability to legislate financial
regulation. First, the common rulebook is limited to only technical financial
174
rules. Second, the treaty-based principle of proportionality limits lawmakers by
requiring that their acts not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives
175
of Article 114 of the TFEU. For the purposes of enacting the common
176
rulebook, the regulatory objectives are defined by the Single Market concept.
Together, these limitations mean that the financial regulations enacted must be
177
purely technical and narrowly tailored to support the Single Market.
Considering these checks on the power of the ESAs, it is clear that any financial
legislation considered at the EU level will be heavily scrutinized before being
178
added to the common technical rulebook.
Regardless of one’s view on the appropriate degree of regulatory
centralization, the bargain in a harmonized regime like the European Union is
that Member States forego their ability to maintain independent requirements,
while each nation reaps benefits from the broader impacts of the Single Market—
namely, enhancement of freedoms of movement and establishment among the
179
entire European Union. The ultimate goal is a healthy Single Market, and
180
uniformity in certain areas of financial regulation is required to meet that end.
Through a broader use of Regulations, EU-level authorities will take pressure off
their national counterparts, allowing Member States to concentrate on their local
markets with the knowledge that there is a level playing field across the
European Union.
VI. CONCLUSION
The financial reforms in the European Union provide a useful model for
181
discussing forward-looking practices of financial rulemaking. Because other

174. See supra Part IV.B.
175. See Andrea M. Corcoran & Terry L. Hart, The Regulation of Cross-Border Financial Services in the
EU Internal Market, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 221, 230 (2002).
176. See supra Part IV.B.
177. See supra Part IV.B.
178. See, e.g., EUR. SCRUTINY COMM., Written Evidence From the British Bankers’ Association,
PARLIAMENT.UK (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/1817/
1817vw04.htm.
179. Corcoran & Hart, supra note 175, at 237 (2002).
180. See supra Part II.A.
181. See generally YANNOS PAPANTONIOU, FRIENDS OF EUROPE, THE LESSONS OF THE EUROZONE
CRISIS THAT SHOULD SHAPE THE EU’S G20 STANCE (2011), available at http://www.friendsofeurope.
org/Contentnavigation/Library/Libraryoverview/tabid/1186/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/2556/TheLessons-of-the-Eurozone-Crisis-that-Should-Shape-the-EUs-G20-Stance.aspx (discussing Europe’s “unique
chance to lead by example” in the context of the Eurozone crisis, which is equally applicable in the context of
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global financial reforms are still in their early stages, many regulators and
institutions are eagerly watching how the European Union handles its new
182
financial rulemaking duties. The role of the ESFS, and in particular the ESAs,
in promulgating a common technical rulebook within the European Union may
ultimately prove to be a grand experiment in demonstrating whether the concept
183
of a Single Market is actually sustainable. Regardless, EU leaders have
recognized regulatory arbitrage as a present-day evil that should be combatted
184
through harmonized financial regulation.
Within the European Union, the availability of regulatory subsidies that vary
from nation to nation provides enterprising institutions opportunities to practice
185
regulatory arbitrage. The narrow risk is that such practices may undermine
regional stability in the European Union, while the larger threat is that there are
186
areas that remain susceptible to regulatory arbitrage at a global scale. In
enacting the common technical rulebook, EU leaders will attempt to mitigate
regulatory arbitrage while minimizing hindrances to market competition among
its Member States. To this end, EU lawmakers should consider varying degrees
of harmonization and a wider use of Regulations when enacting uniform
financial rules.

the common technical rulebook).
182. Marine Cole, Regulatory Arbitrage: Fact, Fiction or a Little of Both?, TABB FORUM (May 17,
2011), http://tabbforum.com/opinions/regulatory-arbitrage-fact-fiction-or-a-little-bit-of-both.
183. See generally Van Rompuy, supra note 91 (referring to Europe as both an economic and political
“project”).
184. See THE DE LAROSIÈRE GROUP, supra note 20, at 27.
185. See generally Santiago Carbo-Valverde, Edward J. Kane & Francisco Rodriguez-Fernandez,
Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross-Border Banking Mergers within the EU (June 7, 2010) (unpublished working
paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619159 (exploring cross-border M&A activity within the
European Union, recommending statistical models to monitor regulatory arbitrage with respect to M&A
activity).
186. As between the powerhouse economies of the United States and the European Union, these include
derivatives, proprietary trading, bank capital requirements, and off-balance sheet securitization. Cole, supra
note 182.
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